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Abstract
We prove that Solovay’s set Σ is generic over the ground model
via a forcing notion whose order relation ⊆-extends the given order
relation.
1 Introduction
Solovay’s paper A model of set theory in which every set of reals is Lebesgue
measurable [6] belongs to the classics of forcing. Its main reasult is the
construction of the said model, and a related model in which only definable
sets are claimed to be Lebesgue measurable, but the axiom of choice holds,
unlike the titular model, where it fails by necessity. During the course
of the paper, Solovay invented several cornerstone methods in the forcing
practice. One of those is an “important lemma” of [6, Section 4.4], which
asserts, roughly, that a generic extension of a ground model also is a generic
extension of any intermediate submodel via a forcing notion Σ which is a
subset of the original forcing notion P .
We prove in this note (Theorem 3), that, in the context of the Solovay
construction, the set Σ itself is generic over the ground model, via a forcing
notion closely related to P in the sense that its domain is equal to the
domain of the original forcing P but the partial order relation ⊆-extends
the given partial order relation ≤P .
As an application, we present a short proof of the following result (The-
orem 4): any subextension of a Cohen-generic extension is a Cohen-generic
extension itself (or else trivial), and the whole extension is a Cohen-generic
extension of the subextension (or else trivial). This is a folklore result known
probably from the first years of forcing, but in fact it does not seem to have
ever been published with proof.
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2 The intermediate forcing Σ
The exact content of Solovay’s result is as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose that P ∈ V is a forcing notion in the set universe
V , G ⊆ P a P-generic filter over V , t ∈ V a P-name, X = t[G] ⊆ V 1.
Then there is a set Σ = Σ(X, t) ∈ V [G], Σ ⊆ P such that
(I) Σ is closed weakwards in P, so that if q ∈ Σ , p ∈ P, and p ≤ q , then
q ∈ Σ ; 2
(II) V [Σ] = V [X] ;
(III) G ⊆ Σ and G is Σ-generic over V [X] ;
(IV) therefore V [G] is a Σ-generic extension of V [X] = V [Σ] ;
(V) if a set G′ ⊆ Σ is Σ-generic over V [X] then G′ is P-generic over V ←−
st5
and still t[G′] = X .
Proof (sketch, see detailed arguments in [6], 4.4). Let Σ = P r
⋃
ξ<ϑAξ ,
where the sequence of sets Aξ ⊆ P is defined in V [G] as follows:
(1) A0 consists of all conditions p ∈ P which either force x˘ ∈ t for some ←−
si1
x ∈ V rX , or force x˘ 6∈ t for some x ∈ X . 3
(2) Aξ+1 consists of all conditions p ∈ P such that there is a dense set
D ∈ V in P satisfying: if q ∈ D and p ≤ q then q ∈ Aξ .
(3) Aλ =
⋃
ξ<λAξ whenever λ is a limit ordinal.
To conclude, each condition p ∈ A0 directly contradicts the assumption that
t is a name for X , by (1), and this contradiction prevails by (2) and (3) for
all bigger ξ in more and more indirect way. This ⊆-increasing sequence of
sets Aξ ⊆ P stabilizes on a limit ordinal ϑ ∈ V , and we have got the sets
A =
⋃
ξ<ϑAξ and Σ = PrA .
Further studies of Grigorieff [2] and others on intermediate submodels of
generic extensions demonstrated that not only V [G] is a generic extension
of V [X] by (III), but V [X] itself is a generic extension of V . 4 Theorem 3
below, our main result, asserts that the set Σ(X, t) itself is a generic filter
over V , via a forcing notion closely related to P .
1 t[G] is the G-valuation, also called interpretation, of the name t ; t[G] ∈ V [G] .
2We always assume that p ≤ q means that q is a stronger condition.
3 If x ∈ V then x˘ is a canonical name for x .
4See also [1, Fact 11], [3, 15.43], [4, Proposition 10.10], [5], or [7, Section 1], among
other references.
2
3 The genericity of the set Σ
Arguing in the context of Proposition 1, we define a new order ≤t on P ,
which extends the original order ≤ = ≤P , as follows: p ≤t q iff q P-forces
over V that p˘ ∈ Σ(t˘[G], t˘). In other words, for p ≤t q it is necessary and
sufficient that we have p ∈ Σ(X, t) whenever G ⊆ P is generic over V ,
X = t[G] , and q ∈ G.
Lemma 2. ≤t is a partial (pre)order relation on P which belongs to V
and extends the given order ≤ = ≤P , so that ≤P ⊆ ≤t (or equivalently,
p ≤P q implies p ≤t q ).
Proof. Suppose that p ≤t q ≤t r . To prove p ≤t r , assume that G ⊆ P is
generic over V , r ∈ G, and X = t[G] ; we have to prove that p ∈ Σ(X, t).
By definition, q ∈ Σ(X, t). Pick a set G′ ⊆ Σ(X, t) Σ(X, t)-generic over
V [X] and containing q . Then G′ is P-generic over V and still t[G′] = X ,
by (V). Therefore p ∈ Σ(X, t), because p ≤t q , and we are done.
Finally, suppose that p ≤ q and prove p ≤t q . Assume that G ⊆ P is
generic over V , q ∈ G, and X = t[G] . To prove that p ∈ Σ(X, t), note first
of all that q ∈ Σ(X, t) by (III); then p ∈ Σ(X, t) by (I).
Theorem 3 (in the assumptions of Proposition 1). Suppose that G ⊆ P is
generic over V and X = t[G]. Then the set Σ = Σ(X, t) itself is a generic
filter over V in the forcing Pt = 〈P ;≤t〉.
Proof. Suppose that p ∈ P , q ∈ Σ, and p ≤t q . To prove p ∈ Σ, consider
any set G′ ⊆ Σ, Σ-generic over V [X] and containing q . Then G′ is P-
generic over V , and t[G′] = X , by (V). Now we have p ∈ Σ since p ≤t q .
Prove that any two conditions p, q ∈ Σ are ≤t-compatible in the set Σ.
By genericity there is a condition r ∈ G which forces both p˘ ∈ Σ(t˘[G], t˘)
and q˘ ∈ Σ(t˘[G], t˘). Then by definition p ≤t r and q ≤t r , and on the other
hand r ∈ Σ by (III).
Finally prove the genericity itself. Suppose that a set D ⊆ P is ≤t-
dense (not necessarily dense w.r.t. the original order). Assume towards the
contrary that some p ∈ G forces D˘ ∩ Σ(t˘[G], t˘) = ∅ . By density, there is a
condition q ∈ D , p ≤t q .
Consider a set G′ ⊆ P , P-generic over V and containing q , and let
X ′ = t[G′] . Then q ∈ G′ ⊆ Σ′ = Σ(X ′, t), and hence p ∈ Σ′ by the above.
Further, consider a set G′′ ⊆ Σ′ , Σ′-generic over V [X ′] and containing
p . Then G′′ is P-generic over V , and t[G′′] = X ′ , by (V). Thus q ∈
D ∩ Σ(t[G′′], t) and p ∈ G′′ , contrary to the choice of p .
3
4 Intermediate submodels of Cohen-generic extensions
Now we are getting the following for free.
Theorem 4 (forcing folklore). Assume that a ∈ 2ω is a Cohen-generic real
over the set universe V , and X ∈ V [a], X ⊆ V . Then
(i) either X ∈ V or V [X] is a Cohen-generic extension of V ;
(ii) either V [X] = V [a] or V [a] is a Cohen-generic extension of V [X] .
Proof. Note that the Cohen forcing is countable. Therefore both Σ in
Proposition 1 and Q in Theorem 3 are countable forcing notions.
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